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Abstract 
 
Social norms can help to foster cooperation and to overcome the free-rider problem in private 
provision of public goods. This paper focuses on the enforcement of social norms by a self-
introduced punishment and reward scheme. We analyse if subjects achieve to implement a norm-
enforcement mechanism at their own expense by applying the theory of non-governmental norm-
enforcement by Buchholz et al. (2014) in a laboratory experiment. Based on their theory without 
central authority and endogenously determined enforcement mechanism, we implement a two-
stage public good game: At the first stage subjects determine the strength of penalty/reward on their 
own and in the second stage they decide on their contributions to the public good. We find that the 
mechanism by Buchholz et al. (2014) leads to a higher public good contribution than without the use 
of any mechanism. Only in a few cases groups end up with a zero enforcement mechanism. This 
result indicates that subjects are apparently willing to contribute funds for implementing an 
enforcement mechanism. Moreover, higher enforcement parameters lead to higher public good 
contributions in the second stage, although too high enforcement parameters lead to unreachable 
theoretical optima. 
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1. Introduction  
Although cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas is observable (e.g. charitable giving, voting, 
recycling), the incentives for free-riding are still high for individuals. Therefore, the analyses of the 
private provision of public goods and its free-rider problem have a long theoretical and experimental 
tradition (e.g. Cornes and Sandler 1985, Bergstrom et al. 1986).1 Despite research in sociology and 
psychology also in economic science attention has shifted to social norms. These norms can help to 
overcome the free-rider problem and are one of the key factors for cooperation (Voss 2001, p 110, 
Fehr and Fischbacher 2004a). Social norms are in general shared standards of how to behave 
appropriately in specific situations (see e.g. Horne 2001, Ellickson 2001, Voss 2001, Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2004a). This paper focuses on the enforcement of social norms by punishment and 
reward schemes and leaves aside the evolutionary dynamics of social norms discussed by other 
researchers (see e.g. Axelrod 1986, Sethi and Somanathan 1996, Ostrom 2000, Azar 2004).  
The aim of this paper is to analyse whether subjects achieve to implement a norm-enforcement 
mechanism on their own costs to impose the provision of public goods. Therefore, we conduct a 
laboratory experiment based on the theory by Buchholz et al. (2014). In this theory the strength of a 
non-governmental enforcement mechanism is endogenously determined by the subjects themselves. 
At this model's first stage individuals decide on their contributions to finance an enforcement 
mechanism. At the second stage they decide on their contributions to the public good based on the 
established enforcement mechanism. The underlying social norm itself is taken as given and is 
determined by the average contribution to the public good. Deviations from this standard are 
punished or rewarded. Different to third party punishment approaches (e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2000, 
Fehr et al. 2002, Fehr and Fischbacher 2004a, 2004b), this sanctioning mechanism is endogenously 
implemented by the actors themselves and before the subjects decide on their public good 
contributions in the second stage.2 So the subjects have to solve a two-fold public good problem: 
contributing to the enforcement mechanism and contributing to the public good.  
Furthermore, the non-governmental norm enforcement mechanism by Buchholz et al. (2014) 
contributes also to the research on matching mechanisms, which are possible instruments to 
strengthen cooperation in social dilemmas. Matching mechanisms are strongly related to social 
norms because the individual provision depends on the others’ provision of public goods, which 
shows conditional cooperation and adhering social norms in subjects’ social environment (Guttman 
2013). Theoretically, matching mechanisms ‘manipulate’ the effective price of a public good to 
incentivise the voluntary public good provision. Mechanisms with or without a central role of the 
government can be distinguished and there is a broad range of applications for matching schemes 
(Buchholz et al. 2011). 
Among the related experimental literature on matching behaviour without central authority is a 
laboratory experiment by Guttman (1986) based on the theory by Guttman (1978) in which the 
conditional cooperation increases the public good provision at lower costs. In this repeated public 
goods games experiment subjects contribute in the current round to the public good conditionally on 
1 Also see Löschel and Rübbelke (2014) discussing voluntary provision and undersupply of public goods in an 
international context.  
2 For an approach with endogenously determined intensity of the social norm, see Lindbeck et al. (1999). 
Mengel (2008) provides another approach endogenizing the strength of the norm, defined as rising number of 
agents internalizing the social norm in a prisoners’ dilemma interaction model. 
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the other group members’ previous contributions. This implicit matching leads to higher contribution 
levels compared to unconditional settings with individually provided public goods. Moreover, these 
conditional contributions are higher for subjects with a higher marginal payoff from the public good 
provision. Furthermore, Andreoni and Varian (1999) implement the mechanism by Guttman (1978, 
1987) as binding offers of side payments by one individual to another at the first stage and the 
decision on cooperation at the second stage in a prisoners’ dilemma experiment. They find that the 
mechanism supports cooperation and the Pareto efficient outcome is achieved. However, 
decentralized mechanisms are limited when the group size is large because the personal interaction 
of agents as driving factor for cooperation is difficult in larger groups (e.g. Buchholz et al. 2014).  
The theory by Falkinger et al. (1996) on a centralized matching mechanism is tested in an experiment 
by Falkinger et al. (2000) with a subsidy-tax scheme, in which the government rewards or penalises 
deviations from the average public good provision.3 Their results show that the mean contributions 
are higher in the mechanism treatment. Bracht et al. (2008) compare the two mechanisms in a 
laboratory experiment: compensation mechanism by Guttman (1978) implemented as subsidizing 
contributions in a pre-stage and the Falkinger mechanism with centralized subsidy. The results show 
higher public good provision with both mechanisms compared to public good provision without any 
mechanisms. Concerning the predictions of the average level of contributions, the Falkinger 
mechanism performs better in their laboratory experiment. In contrast to the theory by Falkinger et 
al. (2000) which has an exogenous reward scheme, Buchholz et al. (2014) provide a theory without 
central authority and an endogenous norm-enforcement mechanism.  
Schultz et al. (2007) and Alcott (2011) conduct field experiments closely related to the idea of social 
norms as non-governmental mechanism. In both field experiments the effect of descriptive and 
injunctive norms on subjects’ energy conservation is analysed. In these non-price approaches Schultz 
et al. (2007) show that the initial levels of energy consumption have a crucial impact on the effect of 
descriptive norms leading to the so called boomerang effect,4 which can partly be absorbed by 
implementing an injunctive norm. Alcott (2011) finds that the effects of such norms conveyed via so-
called ‘home energy reports’ are equivalent to an 11 to 20% short-run price increase. 
In this paper we base our experiment on the theory by Buchholz et al. (2014) to evaluate the 
matching method and its suitability for coordinating the private provision of public goods. A two-
stage design in a non-governmental mechanism environment is analysed. In particular the 
endogenous determination of an enforcement mechanism has not been experimentally tested in this 
context and we analyse whether subjects are willing to implement such a mechanism. We apply a 
non-linear payoff function to design the theory of Buchholz et al. (2014) in the same way as in 
Falkinger et al. (2000) or Bracht et al. (2008). In our setting without a central authority and an 
endogenously determined punishment/reward scheme, we find higher public good provision with 
the mechanism. Furthermore, subjects initially fund the enforcement parameter. In particular, only 
in a few cases groups ended with a zero enforcement mechanism, which shows that subjects are 
willing to contribute funds for implementing an enforcement mechanism. Moreover, higher 
enforcement parameters lead to higher public good contributions in the second stage. The results 
3 Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) also suggest an effective-price influencing mechanism involving a central 
authority. See Baker et al. (2009) who test different centralized matching mechanisms, either a lump-sum 
matching when reaching a threshold or one-to-one matching in a laboratory experiment.  
4 Households initially consuming less than the average use the descriptive norm as justification to consume 
more. 
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are in line with previous experiments with matching mechanism, but additionally provide 
information on the endogenous establishment of an enforcement mechanism.  
2. Mechanism and Experimental Implementation  
Mechanism 
The theory is based on the paper by Buchholz et al. (2014) on voluntary public good provision 
influenced by social norms in a setting without governmental intervention. As the authors show, the 
considered mechanism establishing and enforcing norms may be effective in overcoming free-rider 
problems even when facing voluntary public good provision in large societies.  
The model simultaneously handles two voluntary provision problems in a two-stage game: At the 
first stage, individuals voluntarily contribute to finance an agency establishing and enforcing a norm. 
At the second stage, individuals – influenced by the norm and its enforcement by the agency – decide 
on their voluntary provision to the public good. The specific norm applied is the average contribution 
of all the other individuals to the public good, so the budget for rewarding and punishing is balanced 
(see also Falkinger et al. 2000). 
This non-governmental norm enforcement mechanism is to a certain extent related to previous 
mechanisms with or without a central role for the government. Among the decentral mechanisms is 
the matching approach first suggested by Guttman (1978), in which the free-rider problem in public 
good provision is addressed in a setting comprised of two stages. At the first stage, individual agents 
stipulate their matching rates, i.e. conditional contributions to the public good made per unit of the 
other agents’ public good provision. At the second stage, agents provide their contribution to the 
public good, which is not made conditionally on other agents’ provision.  
The paper by Falkinger (1996) provides a mechanism with a central authority’s intervention. Here, at 
the first stage, the government decides on rates rewarding individual agents’ contribution deviating 
from the other agents’ average contribution to the public good. At the second stage, individual 
agents set their voluntary contributions to the public good, taking into account the rewarding rates, 
which are exogenous for them.  
In contrast, in Buchholz et al. (2014), the non-governmental norm-enforcement mechanism’s reward 
rate is influenced by the agents through their voluntary contributions at stage one of the game, i.e. 
by the level of funds channelled towards the norm-enforcing agency. Thus, the reward rates are not 
exogenous anymore. Secondly, in the Falkinger (1996) scheme there is no transaction cost associated 
with the government’s activity. The endogenously determined norm-enforcement causes costs, 
which are covered by the subjects’ donations at stage one.5  
The norm-enforcement model includes a scenario in which the group financing the enforcement 
mechanism (first stage) and the target group (second stage) differ as well as a scenario in which both 
may coincide. We focus on the latter, which is also in line with Coleman’s (1990) classification of a 
conjoint norm targeting and benefiting the same individuals.  
5 Please note that with altruistic punishment/reward (e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2002) or also endogenously 
determined punishment and reward schemes (see e.g. Ertan et al. 2009, Kosfeld et al. 2009) there is no decline 
of the effective price of the public good like in the matching approaches.  
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In the specification of the general setting in Buchholz et al. (2014), a Cobb-Douglas utility function of 
the form  
𝑈 = 𝑐𝛼𝐺1−𝛼 (1) 
 
is employed where c is private consumption and 𝐺 total public good supply. Private consumption 𝑐 
comprises the consumption of a private good 𝑦 and ‘social esteem’ 𝑟 generated through the norm-
enforcement mechanism, i.e.  
𝑐 = 𝑦 + 𝑟 (2) 
 
The public good G is defined as  
𝐺 = � 𝑔𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
  
(3) 
 
Prices of the individual goods are set equal to unity. Then, the monetary income 𝐼 constraint reads as 
follows:  
𝐼 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖  (4) 
 
The reward 𝑟 is positive for those contributing more and negative for those contributing less than the 
average of all other agents. The reward can be specified as:  
𝑟 =  𝛽(𝑔𝑖 − 𝐺−𝑖(𝑛 − 1))  (5) 
 
The deviation from the average is weighted by parameter 𝛽, which represents the strength of the 
sanctioning mechanism. This strength – in turn – depends on the amount of donations 𝐸 = ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  
collected by the agency at stage one of the game, with 𝛽 = 𝛽(𝐸), 𝛽(0) = 0, 𝛽(𝐸) < 1, 𝛽′(𝐸) > 0, 
and 𝛽′′(𝐸) < 0. 
By maximizing (1) subject to (4), we obtain the following FOC: 
𝑀𝑅𝑆 ≡ −
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝐺
= 1 − 𝛽. (6)  
 
Equivalently to the exogenously fixed reward rate in Falkinger (1996), the effective price of public 
good provision is reduced by 𝛽 (see right-hand side of (6)). To put it differently, the FOCs in the 
norm-enforcement model (Buchholz et al. 2014) and in the tax-subsidy model by Falkinger (1996) are 
formally equivalent. Yet, the driving forces for the decline in the effective price differ. In the norm-
enforcement model, the decline takes place via an increase in an agent’s private consumption 
(augmentation of social esteem) by 𝛽 per unit of his public good provision. In Falkinger’s tax-subsidy 
model, the respective agent receives a subsidy or conditional transfer of 𝛽 monetary units per unit of 
his public good provision. 
As the FOCs are decisive for an agent’s decision making and as these coincide in both models, we 
could consider either of both effective price reduction channels (monetary-subsidy payment or 
5 
 
private-consumption ‘grant’) in our experimental analysis.6 It proved more feasible to employ the 
‘subsidy interpretation’ in order to implement the norm-enforcement model by Buchholz et al. 
(2014) in an experimental setting. The specification of 𝛽 in Buchholz et al. (2014) is: 
𝛽 = 1 − 11 + 𝐸𝑛−𝛾   (7) 
 
The parameter 𝛾 indicates the degree of rivalry in the use of funds available for the norm-enforcing 
agency. It is restricted to 𝛾 ∈ [0,1], where zero stands for non-rivalry and one for full-rivalry. The 
degree of rivalry shows whether the norm could be enforced as a public good addressing all 
individuals equally or if the norm has to be enforced individually. We focus on non-rivalry in our 
experiment and therefore employ the following specification:  
𝛽 = 1 − 11 + 𝐸   (8) 
 
Experimental Implementation 
In the context of social norms, the social esteem parameter 𝑟 can be interpreted as experience of 
guilt or shame related to so-called oughtness norms (Hechter and Opp 2001, p xiii).7 According to 
Hechter and Opp (2001), these types of norms are associated with moral obligations and subjects 
follow them no matter of the outcome. The theory by Buchholz et al. (2014) is specified for the 
experiment as ‘subsidy interpretation’ explained in the previous section. The social esteem 
parameter 𝑟 is monetized like subsidies and taxes in the tax-subsidy model by Falkinger (1996). It can 
be negative or positive depending on the own contribution compared to the average contribution to 
the public good by the other players in the group. In monetizing the social esteem parameter 𝑟, we 
transform the underlying norm to a regulatory norm with social expectations (Hechter and Opp 
2001). Subjects not complying with the norm, by deviating from the average in our case, are 
punished.  
Deviating from the common linear payoff structure with boundary equilibria, the predictions of the 
theory are based on a Cobb-Douglas utility function with interior solutions.8 Fitting the experimental 
design to the based theory, the payoff function has to fulfil an underlying Cobb-Douglas utility 
function and the budget constraint described in (4). Therefore we implement the individual non-
linear payoff function also used by Falkinger et al. (2000) and Bracht et al. (2008) based on Keser 
(1996):  
𝜋𝑖 = 5 ∙ 𝑐𝑖 − 0.05 ∙ 𝑐𝑖2 + 𝐺 (9) 
 
6 Please take into account that the nominal unit prices of the private and public goods are assumed to be equal 
to unity.  
7 Please see Rege (2008) for a model in which the social status signals subjects’ non-observable abilities.  
8 Here we use an approach with interior solutions due to three main reasons: Firstly, to set up a design close to 
the underlying theory with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Secondly, to compare our results with those papers 
closely related to ours by Falkinger et al. (2000) and Bracht et al. (2008), who also use a non-linear payoff 
function. Thirdly, to overcome limits of boundary equilibria where decision errors can only lead to over-
contribution, but not to under-contribution (see e.g. Andreoni 1993, Ledyard 1995, Keser 1996, Sefton and 
Steinberg 1996). Furthermore, zero contributions can be seen as socially unacceptable (see Keser 1996). For 
further discussion on voluntary public goods provision with interior solutions please see Laury and Holt (2008). 
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𝐺 is the sum of the group’s public good contributions (for a group of 3 subjects: ∑ 𝑔𝑖3𝑖=1 ). This means 
that individuals get paid the group’s contributions from the public good. 𝑐𝑖 is the remaining private 
money for private consumption. In the mechanism treatment 𝑐𝑖 depends on the decisions in the first 
and second stage.  
𝑐𝑖 = 𝐼𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽 ∙ (𝑔𝑖 − 𝐺−𝑖2 )  (10) 
 
The subjects get an endowment 𝐼𝑖 with which they can decide on their contributions in the game. In 
the first stage they decide on the contribution to the enforcement mechanism 𝑒𝑖 and in the second 
stage on the public good provision 𝑔𝑖. The enforcement parameter 𝛽 results from summing up the 
group contributions (𝐸 = ∑ 𝑒𝑖3𝑖=1 ) in the first stage and is calculated according to (8). The translation 
of the group investment 𝐸 to the enforcement agency into the strength of sanctioning is provided in 
a table based on the equation (8) for the participating subjects.  
In the baseline treatment, 𝑐𝑖 reduces with only one stage and 𝛽 = 0 to: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝐼𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 (11) 
 
The equilibria predictions for the enforcement parameter 𝛽 are based on the efficiency condition by 
Falkinger et al. (2000) with 𝛽 = 1 − (1 𝑛⁄ ), resulting for a group of 3 subjects in 𝛽∗ = 2 3⁄ . Based on 
the payoff function (9) and (10), the equilibrium for the public good provision can be calculated with 
𝑔𝑖
∗ = −10 (𝛽 − 1)⁄ . The following Table 1 provides the summary of our experimental design 
including the predicted interior equilibria.  
Table 1: Summary of Experimental Design 
Treatment Group size 
Endowment 
per period MRS E ß 
Equilibria 
prediction 
Baseline 3 50 LD 1 - - 𝑔𝐵 = 10 
Mechanism 3 50 LD 1-ß 2 2/3* 𝑔𝑀 = 30∗∗ 
Note: LD= laboratory dollar 
*Based on the efficiency condition by Falkinger et al. (2000) ß=1-(1/n).  
**Based on the payoff-function (8) and (9) the equilibrium can be calculated with gi= -10/(ß-1). 
3. Experimental Procedure  
The subjects were randomly assigned to treatments and groups of three anonymous players. 
Subjects played either the mechanism or the baseline treatment.  
The mechanism treatment is a two-stage public good game based on the theory by Buchholz et al. 
(2014). The subjects are endowed with €8 (50 LD) and decide at the first stage on their contribution 
to a norm-enforcement mechanism. By endogenously funding the mechanism on their own cost, 
they establish a norm defined as average contribution. 
Before subjects decide on their contribution to the public good at the second stage, they experience 
the sum of all contributions in the group, the average contribution to the institution of the first stage, 
the resulting enforcement parameter 𝛽, and their remaining money on their private accounts (see z-
tree screenshots in the Appendix A5). At the second stage subjects contribute to the public good 
based on the resulting enforcement parameter 𝛽 of the first stage. Beside the subjects’ decisions on 
public good contributions, they additionally tell their expectations of the other group members’ 
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average contribution to the public good in the second stage. After their decision they learn about the 
sum of the group contributions to the public good, the average contributions, the income of the 
other group members, and their own income distinguished by its origin (public good, private account, 
punishment/reward). All the information is anonymously provided and includes all previous periods 
(see z-tree screenshots in the Appendix A5).  
Our control treatment labelled as baseline is a simple public good game without mechanism, which 
reduces the mechanisms treatment to a one-stage game (𝛽 = 0). In both treatments the one shot 
games were repeated 10 times (plus two practice periods at the beginning) to allow for learning 
effects in both cases and to illustrate recurrent social interaction. 
Experimental Protocol  
The experiment was run in the laboratory mLab at the University of Mannheim, Germany. Students 
were recruited via the recruitment software Orsee (Greiner 2004). Overall, 108 subjects participated, 
with 51 subjects in baseline and 57 subjects in the mechanism treatment. They got a €4 show up fee 
and could additionally earn money from the game. The experiment was conducted with the software 
z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). The subjects were randomly assigned to the treatments and in each 
session randomly assigned to a group of three players. They were instructed about the rules of the 
game with the help of a manuscript including the payoff function with numerical examples, and 
control questions to check the understanding of these instructions (see Appendix A4). We ensured 
that all subjects answered the entire control questions correctly before starting the experiment. The 
experiment included 2 practice and 10 payoff relevant periods. For both treatments they got an 
endowment of 50 laboratory dollar (LD) in each period. At the end of the experiment one round was 
randomly drawn for payment. The LDs were transferred in Euro with the rate 0.08. The average 
earnings (excluding the show-up-fee) were €12.24 in baseline and €12.36 in the mechanism 
treatment.9 After the game the subjects answered a questionnaire on risk, trust, rules and socio-
demographic aspects.  
4. Results  
Contributions on the individual level to the public good (at the second stage) are on average 12.81 
(standard deviation 4.52) for baseline, and 27.45 (standard deviation 10.85) for the mechanism 
treatment, which reveals higher contribution levels but also larger variation in the mechanism 
treatment (see Table 2). In the baseline treatment a fraction of 50.78% of individuals contribute close 
(0-10% deviation) to the equilibrium of 𝑔𝐵 = 10 with 48.43% exactly contributing the equilibrium. 
On average, subjects in the baseline treatment spend 25.62% of their endowment to the public good. 
In the mechanism treatment this fraction (27 ≤ 𝑔𝑖𝑀 ≤ 33) is only 13.15%, which we attribute to the 
complex design. The most frequent contribution was 𝑔𝑖
𝑀 = 10 with a fraction of 11.93% and 
𝑔𝑖
𝑀 = 20 with a fraction of 10.53%. On average, subjects spend 54.94% of the initial endowment and 
9 Please note that the payout period was randomly drawn. Looking at the potential payoffs, the average 
earnings in baseline are €12.19 with a standard deviation of 0.59 and €12.46 in the mechanism treatment with 
a standard deviation of 1.23. The potential payoffs are significantly different (p=0.0007 Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test). The median of the potential earnings in baseline and mechanisms are significantly different from the 
earnings when reaching the equilibria (Wilcoxon singed rank test p=0.0276 for baseline and p=0.0000 for 
mechanism treatment). 
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58.08% of the remaining endowment to the public good in the second stage. The following Table 2 
provides the summary statistics. 
Table 2: Summary statistics* 
Treatment 
1st stage 
contribution 
to 
mechanism 
min/max 
group 
contribution 
to mechanism 
in 1st stage 
Resulting ß 
Group 
contribution 
PG 
min/max group 
contribution 
Baseline - - - 12.81 9.22/16.22 
Mechanism 7.84 0/48 0.76 27.47 24.42/29.95 
*Only payoff relevant periods are included, not the two training periods at the beginning. 
 
The individual decisions over the ten periods are not independent. Therefore, we base further 
analyses on group average.10 We focus on the treatment level and additionally provide details on 
single groups. 
The contributions of the two treatments are significantly different from each other based on a 
Kruskal-Wallis test (p=0.0001). Figure 1 shows the mean contributions of groups for the periods 1-10 
by treatment and their confidence intervals. The graph for baseline shows declining contributions 
over time, as other experimental studies of private public good provision have shown before (see e.g. 
Ledyard 1995 or in non-linear settings Keser 1996, Sefton and Steinberg 1996, Falkinger et al. 2000, 
Bracht et a. 2008). The contributions in baseline are above the equilibrium of 𝑔𝐵 = 10, except for the 
last period in which the group contributions fall below the theoretical equilibrium. Comparisons of 
the first and second half in the baseline treatment (p=0.0000 Wilcoxon signed rank test), as well as 
the first and the last period (p=0.0000 Wilcoxon signed rank test) show significant differences and 
provide evidence for an end round effect (e.g. Andreoni 1988, Laury and Holt 2008). The median of 
the group contributions differs significantly (p=0.0000 median test) from the theoretical equilibrium 
of 𝑔𝐵 = 10. The average contribution over all periods in baseline is 12.81 with standard deviation of 
2.13, revealing over-contribution. This result is in line with findings by Falkinger et al. (2000) and 
Bracht et al. (2008) with different group sizes (4 subjects and 2 subjects respectively).  
In the mechanism treatment the contributions are higher than in baseline in all rounds. The 
difference is statistically significant (p=0.0000 Mann-Whitney U test). This is also true if we only 
compare the first half (period 1-5) or second half (period 6-10) of the treatments (both p=0.0000 
Mann-Whitney U test). Figure 1 shows rather increasing contributions over time than declining 
contribution behaviour. Tests comparing the first and second half of the mechanism treatment 
(p=0.0000 Wilcoxon signed rank test) as well as a comparison of the first and the last round 
(p=0.0000 Wilcoxon signed rank test) in the mechanism treatment are significantly different. These 
results rather indicate a learning effect of the 10 payment relevant periods, which is in contrast to 
results by Falkinger et al. (2000) with exogenous parameter, where subjects played close to the 
equilibrium from the first periods onwards. 
Although the second stage optimal contribution depends on the previously realized enforcement 
parameter (gi∗ = −10 (β − 1)⁄ ), we first compare the public good contribution to the theoretical 
equilibrium of 𝑔𝑀 = 30. This perspective enables us to relate our resulting provision levels with 
those of previous research with similar mechanisms, but exogenously given punishment parameters 
10 We base the tests on group average due to independency at this level (see Falkinger et al. 2000). 
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by Falkinger et al. (2000) and Bracht et al. (2008). Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, the 
subgame-perfect equilibria are solved by backward induction in which the second stage equilibrium 
is solved first.  
If we assume the optimal behaviour in stage one, resulting in a 𝛽∗ = 2 3⁄ , the optimal contribution in 
equilibria would be 𝑔𝑀 = 30. All the mean contributions in the mechanism treatment are below or 
at this equilibrium. There is a significant difference between the 𝑔𝑀 = 30 equilibria and the actual 
median group contributions (p= 0.0000 median test). The average contribution over all periods is 
27.45 with a standard deviation of 1.79, indicating under-contribution. Although the public good is 
underprovided, on average the contributions in mechanism are closer to the theoretical equilibrium 
than in baseline.  
We calculate the confidence intervals (CI) for the two treatments in the manner of Falkinger et al. 
(2000) and Bracht et al. (2008) by bootstrapping to provide deeper insight than the previous 
reported standard deviations.11 Figure 1 shows the resulting CIs for both treatments. The CIs of the 
treatments do not overlap in any round. The CI for the mechanism treatment is wider compared to 
baseline, which shows a larger variation of contributions in mechanism. The CI in baseline gets 
narrower in the end periods. In the mechanism treatment it is unchanged wide. The CI in mechanism 
includes the equilibrium in far more periods than in baseline. This indicates that playing the 
equilibrium in mechanism cannot be rejected.  
Figure 1: Mean contributions periods 1-10 per treatment 
 
 
Note: Reported are the mean group contributions to the public good in the second stage for the 
periods 1-10. The equilibria are based on theoretical predictions. The CIs are calculated by 
bootstrapping.  
 
11 As the basis for the calculation of the CIs we use individual contributions, but we accounted for learning 
effects by drawing period 1-10 from the same group. For the random draws with replacement we use 1,000 
bootstrap samples and the 95% interval. 
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The mean contributions of each group are provided in Table 4 for the baseline treatment and in 
Table 5 for the mechanism treatment in the Appendix A1. The lowest (highest) mean group 
contribution over the ten rounds is 8.53 (18.20) in the baseline and 12.37 (44.35) in the mechanism 
treatment. The range of contributions is not that wide in Falkinger et al. (2000) with an exogenously 
given parameter.  
Looking at the group dynamics of individual’s contribution over the ten periods (Figure 5 and Figure 
6, Appendix A2) in more detail, we see only in a few groups in the baseline treatment that the 
individual contributions vary, whereas most groups play the same strategy over the ten rounds with 
roughly equal contributions. In the mechanism treatment the individuals’ contributions vary widely, 
but in more than half of the groups the individuals show stable behaviour in contributing roughly the 
same over the 10 periods. The individual level supports the previous results on group average: i) 
group contributions vary more widely in the mechanism treatment than in baseline, ii) first half 
contributions are higher and vary more widely than second half contributions in the baseline 
treatment whereas in mechanism the contrary is the case, iii) in baseline a tendency towards over-
contribution and in mechanism towards under-contribution is observable like in Falkinger et al. 
(2000). 
Result 1: The contributions in the mechanism treatment are significantly higher than in baseline. 
On average and on group level, under-contribution in the mechanism treatment is observable.  
Nevertheless, the second stage equilibrium depends on the first stage’s endogenously specified 
enforcement parameter. The mean group contribution to the enforcement mechanism is 7.84 (5.23% 
of the endowment) and the resulting β ranges from 0 to 0.98 (see Table 2).12 However, the most 
individuals contribute between zero and five in the first stage and only 0.72% of the contribution 
decisions are higher than 25, which is the theoretical upper bound of first stage contribution (see).13 
The variation of the contribution to the enforcement mechanism in the last period only ranges from 
0 to 7, which might be explained by learning effects. Almost 40% contributed nothing to the 
enforcement mechanism. This leads to the question how many groups result in a β = 0 and if their 
contributions in the second stage are then in line with the baseline equilibria. Overall eleven times 
β = 0 was realized by 5 different groups (with 4 group repeatedly realizing β = 0). The 42.42% of the 
individuals confronted with a β = 0 contributed 10 LD to the public good in the second stage, which 
is in line with the baseline equilibria. The theoretically optimal enforcement parameter with β =2/3 
was reached 19 times in 10 different groups. 10.53% of individuals played the equilibrium of 30 LD in 
the second stage when β =2/3 was realized.  
  
12 The high values result from some very high contributions, which might indicate that subjects did not 
understand how the mechanism works. 
13 The upper bound of first stage contribution is based on the theoretical proposition that average 
contributions to the enforcement mechanism are never higher than half of the endowment by Buchholz et al. 
(2014), which is in our case 25.  
11 
 
                                                          
Figure 2: Individuals’ contribution to enforcement mechanism in stage 1 periods 1-10 
 
Note: Reported is the density of the individual’s contribution to the enforcement mechanism 
over the period 1-10.  
 
Furthermore, an overview on the individuals' contributions to the enforcement mechanism (Figure 7, 
Appendix A3) shows that in most groups low levels of first stage contributions are observable, which 
is in line with the theory. Nevertheless, in a small number of cases the group ends up with a zero 
enforcement mechanism. This is on the one hand due to the fact that for the implementation only 
one group member needs to contribute (Figure 3) and on the other hand that we ensured the 
understanding of the game by control questions. 
Figure 3: Frequency of realized enforcement parameter periods 1-10 
 
Note: Reported is the frequency of the realized enforcement parameter beta of all periods 1-10. 
 
Result 2: Subjects are willing to establish norm-enforcement with their donations at the first stage. 
The motivation for establishing the norm at the first stage could be strategical or intrinsical. A linear 
regression of the first stage contributions to the enforcement parameter shows neither significant 
effects of the socio-demographic nor of the behavioural variables (risk, trust, social-norm indicator) 
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of the post-questionnaire. We run regressions for each period. In period 1 none of the explanatory 
variables was significant, contrary to punishment settings in which trust increases punishment (e.g. 
Kocher et al. 2012). 
In the second stage contributions to the public good theoretically depend on the realized 
enforcement parameter. A higher enforcement parameter should lead to higher contributions to the 
public good (see red line in Figure 4). However, as the subjects’ budgets are restricted in the first 
place and they can only spend the remaining money after the first round, the theoretical optima are 
not reachable at levels of 𝛽 ≥ 0.8 (see shaded area in Figure 4). Figure 4 shows that the group 
contributions increase with higher enforcement parameter, but are in most cases below the 
theoretical optima. The increase of group contributions according to the higher enforcement 
parameter is in line with the theoretical predictions and with empirical findings by Bracht et al. 
(2008). They varied the exogenously given parameter and found higher contributions the higher the 
given parameter was.  
Figure 4: Group contributions by realized enforcement parameter 
 
Note: Reported are the group contributions to the public good at the 2nd stage by realized enforcement 
parameter. The red line shows the theoretically optimal group contribution based on the enforcement 
parameter. The shaded area marks the unreachable theoretical optima due to budget restrictions.  
 
Result 3: Mean group contributions tend to be higher the stronger the mechanism.  
Result 4: Group contributions tend to be lower than the calculated optimum based on realized 
enforcement mechanism. 
Furthermore, we analyse the contributions on the group level with a linear regression (Table 3). 
Supporting previous result 1, the contributions in mechanism treatment are higher than in baseline. 
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The influence of the enforcement parameter 𝛽 on the contributions at the group level is significant 
and depends on the niveau, supporting the previous results 4 and 5.  
Table 3: Linear regression of contribution on group level period 1-10 
Variables Group contribution second 
stage 
Baseline  
(treatment dummy) 
-13.9235*** 
(0.5158) 
Beta 6.2105*** 
(1.8080) 
Beta^2 -6.3541*** 
(1.6801) 
Constant 26.7294*** 
(0.4891) 
No. of observations 360 
R² 0.9356 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *** p>0.01, **p<0.05, p*<0.10 
 
In the second stage the effects of the expectations on public good contributions of the other group 
members and the realized enforcement parameter is not distinguishable. The expectations range 
from 0 to 50 with a mean of 23.8. It is not clear if the subjects base their decisions to contribute to 
the public good on their expectations or the realized enforcement parameter they are facing. 
Furthermore, individuals might base their expectations on the realized enforcement parameter 
(corr=0.3353). Nevertheless, a Pearson correlation of 0.6072 supports a positive relation of 
expectation and subject’s own contribution. We can observe that 15.44% contributed the same 
amount as they expect as the other group members’ average. 62.11% of the individuals (in the 
different rounds 1-10) contributed more than they expect as average contribution from the other 
two group members. Out of these individuals 42.97% (in the different rounds 1-10) invest in the 
enforcement mechanism in the first stage.  
Result 5: Expectations on the contributions of the other group members and own contributions to 
the public good at the second stage are positively correlated. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we focus on the enforcement of social norms induced by subjects who fund the 
enforcement mechanism themselves. We apply the theory by Buchholz et al. (2014) – an 
endogenous enforcement mechanism in a two-stage public good game – to a laboratory experiment. 
The design was also based on previous related laboratory experiments on different matching 
mechanisms by Falkinger et al. (2000) and Bracht et al. (2008). In our case, the individuals themselves 
introduced the enforcement mechanism by their own voluntary contributions, contrary to related 
experiments with an exogenously given parameter (see Falkinger et al. 2000, Bracht et al. 2008).  
As in line with experimental results, the contribution in such games with a mechanism is higher than 
without. Even if Pareto efficient outcomes are not reached, the public good provision is higher in the 
mechanism case. In our sample only a few groups ended with a zero enforcement mechanism 
because only one contributing individual is needed to implement an enforcement mechanism. This 
result indicates that subjects are apparently willing to contribute funds for implementing an 
enforcement mechanism. This willingness to voluntarily contribute to the enforcement mechanism is 
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not necessarily due to altruistic motives, but might also be in line with pure self-interest. There is a 
strategic component involved: While direct voluntary contributions of one dollar to the intrinsic 
public good on stage two of the game brings about additional public good consumption only of a 
one-dollar worth, the same dollar spent on the first stage may induce a multiplier effect: the donated 
dollar might bring about a large number of individuals to contribute a value to the public good which 
is much higher than the initially spent dollar. And although the agent donating on the first stage also 
is induced to raise his contribution on the second stage, the multiplier effect may compensate for the 
higher burden this individual will face, i.e. he can gain from the rewarding scheme. The experiment 
also shows that the expected average contributions of the group members are correlated with the 
own public good provision. Further research would be needed to separate effects of expectations 
and the realized enforcement parameter on the public good provision. Moreover, further research 
would be needed to analyse the endogenous norm-enforcement mechanism in more detail in the 
laboratory as well as in the field, e.g. with different group sizes, heterogeneous players, distinction 
between finance and target groups, and alternative underlying social norms.  
Nevertheless, our results might be instructive for non-governmental organizations which could 
exploit the norm-setting/enforcing mechanism in pursuing their objectives of private public good 
provision. Even though our reward scheme was monetized, the results indicate that people are 
willing to pay for such norm-enforcement. Furthermore, the orientation of the subjects towards the 
expected contributions of the other group members reveals that social norms strongly influence 
subjects in their decision making. Both the orientation on social norms and the willingness to 
contribute for the implementation of an enforcement mechanism for such norms can also provide 
implications for law makers, as legal enforcement is likewise based on social norms.  
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7. Appendix 
 
A1: Summary statistics for each group 
Table 4: Summary statistics of the baseline treatment by groups 
Group Mean* periods 1-10 
Mean 
periods 1-5 
Mean 
periods 6-10 
Median 
periods 1-10 
1 10.27 12.00 8.53 10.00 
2 9.73 11.80 7.67 10.00 
3 12.20 14.07 10.33 10.83 
4 10.30 10.33 10.27 10.17 
5 18.20 20.73 15.67 19.17 
6 15.00 16.33 13.67 15.00 
7 16.07 19.47 12.67 15.17 
8 9.90 10.13 9.67 9.50 
9 8.53 6.13 10.93 8.00 
10 11.60 13.86 9.33 10.00 
11 10.47 11.47 9.47 10.00 
12 17.93 24.87 11.00 18.00 
13 16.43 17.20 15.67 18.00 
14 10.23 11.67 8.80 10.00 
15 14.43 17.13 11.73 15.00 
16 9.77 12.40 7.13 8.33 
17 16.63 19.20 14.07 16.00 
Total for all groups  12.81 14.63 10.98 12.54 
*Only payoff relevant periods are included, not the two training periods at the beginning. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics of the mechanism treatment by groups 
Group Mean* periods 1-10 
Mean 
periods 1-5 
Mean 
periods 6-10 
Median 
periods 1-10 
18 29.17 31.33 27.00 30.83 
19 38.23 38.00 38.47 38.50 
20 34.80 28.80 40.80 34.67 
21 21.03 22.67 19.80 22.33 
22 25.37 26.20 24.53 25.50 
23 27.80 27.20 28.40 26.67 
24 26.03 26.33 25.73 25.67 
25 25.67 21.40 29.13 24.83 
26 19.77 18.80 20.73 20.33 
27 26.80 26.87 26.73 26.67 
28 25.30 24.13 26.46 25.50 
29 12.37 11.07 13.67 11.83 
30 35.40 31.93 38.87 35.33 
31 29.37 26.60 32.13 30.83 
32 44.35 41.00 47.51 45.00 
33 33.73 39.13 28.33 35.33 
34 19.18 22.10 16.27 20.00 
35 20.07 18.00 22.13 21.33 
36 27.63 22.73 32.53 25.67 
Total for all groups  27.47 26.75 28.15 27.84 
*Only payoff relevant periods are included, not the two training periods at the beginning. 
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A2: Individual’s 2nd stage contributions over ten rounds 
Figure 5: Individuals’ 2nd stage contributions over period 1-10 in the baseline treatment 
 
Figure 6: Individuals’ 2nd stage contributions over period 1-10 in the mechanism treatment 
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A3: Individual’s 1st stage contributions over ten rounds 
Figure 7: Individuals’ contributions over period 1-10 to the enforcement mechanism 
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A4: Instructions mechanism treatment (translated from German)14 
Welcome to our Experiment! 
Thank you for participating. Please keep your mobile phones turned off during the whole experiment. Please do not talk to other 
participants. Now, please carefully read the following rules of the game.  
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. A staff member will gladly answer your question. 
Regardless of the course of the game you will receive 4 euros for your participation. During the experiment you can earn more 
money. Your additional earnings depend on the course of the game, i.e. on your own decisions and those of the other 
participants in the game. In the experiment, the only currency we calculate with is LaborDollars (LD). At the end of the 
experiment, the LD are converted into euro. The conversion rate is: 
1 LD = 0.08 EUR 
You make your decisions anonymously in the experiment. Only the staff will know your identity and your information will be kept 
confidential.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Rules 
Three players take part in the game, i.e. apart from you, there are two other players. The composition of your group remains the 
same during the whole experiment. Each player has the same decision problem. You make your decisions anonymously. To 
ensure this, you will be given a player number for the duration of the game.  
The three of you play ten independent games in a row. At the beginning of each game, you will receive an initial endowment of 
50 LD. In each game, you make a decision for the use of your initial endowment. After the experiment, one of the ten games will 
be randomly selected for the payoff by the computer. Your income from the selected game will be converted from LD into euro. 
When you leave the lab, you will be paid this amount together with the lump sum of 4 euros. In the beginning, there will be two 
trial games, which are not relevant for disbursement.  
One game consists of two independent stages, respectively. The overall result depends on your decisions and those of the other 
participants in your group. Your task in the game (just like that of the other players in your group) is to make decisions, in two 
stages, on contributions to an institution, a joint project, and a private account. 
In the first stage you can invest in an institution. Through this institution, above-average contributions to a joint project will be 
rewarded and those below-average will be penalised.  
In the second stage, you decide how many LD of the remaining amount from your initial endowment (remaining endowment) 
you want to contribute to a joint project and your private account. 
 
2. Decision Situation 
First stage 
In the beginning of each game, every player receives 50 LD. In the first stage, you and the other players are asked to invest any 
amount in an institution. Depending on this investment, above-average contributions to a joint project will be rewarded and 
below-average contributions will be penalised in the second stage. Each LD that you do not invest in the first stage can be used as 
the remaining endowment for the second stage. 
Remaining endowment = 50 – (your investment in the institution) 
The amount of investments of all group members determines the so called multiplication factor, according to Table A, which 
defines the intensity of the reward or the penalty. The first column in Table A indicates the sum of all investments in the 
institution. The second column indicates the corresponding multiplication factor. In the third column, the variation of the 
multiplication factor if one more unit is invested in the institution is listed. If, for example, 0 LD were invested, the multiplication 
factor in the second stage is 0. If, for example, a total of 3 LD were invested in the institution, the multiplication factor in the 
second stage is 0.75. 
After entering your investment in the institution, you have to click on the “next” button. Afterwards, you cannot change your 
decision in the current game anymore. When all the group members made their investment decisions, the results of this stage 
will be displayed on the screen. In the upper half, you will find the results of all the previous games, and in the lower half, you will 
find the results of the current game.  
Second stage 
In the second stage of the game, you and the other players are asked to make a decision on the contribution to a joint project. 
For this purpose, you can use the remaining endowment from stage 1 and invest any amount in the joint project.  
The remaining amount of LD for your private account depends on the investments of all group members in the institution in the 
first stage and their contributions to the joint project in the second stage. In the following, direct and indirect contributions to 
the private account will be distinguished. Thus, they present the total contribution to your private account. 
Apart from entering your contribution to the joint project, you have to enter your expectation regarding the average 
contribution of all group members to the joint project. This expectation does not influence your payment and is not 
communicated to anyone. After entering your contribution to the joint project and the expected group average, you have to click 
the “Next” button. Afterwards, you cannot change your decision in the current game anymore 
14 Note: In the baseline treatment there is no first stage. 
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After all the group members made their decisions for the contribution to the joint project and entered their expectations, the 
results of this game will be displayed on the screen. In the upper half you, will find the results of all the previous games, and in 
the lower half, you will find the results of the current game.  
 
3. Calculation of Your Income 
Income from the joint project  
The income from the joint project is composed as follows for every member of the group: 
Income from the joint project = Sum of all contributions to the joint project  
Each group member receives the same income from the joint project. If, for example, the total sum of all contributions is 10 LD, 
each group member receives 10 LD as the income from the joint project.  
For each LD that you contribute to the joint project, your income increases by one LD and so does the income of the other group 
members. Through your contribution to the joint project, the other group members also gain money, but you also gain through 
the contributions of the other group members to the joint project. 
Income from your private account 
a) Direct contribution to the private account 
The part of the remaining endowment that you do not contribute to the joint project is the direct contribution to your private 
account. 
Direct contribution to your private account = Remaining endowment – your contribution to the joint project 
b) Indirect contribution to the private account 
The indirect contribution to your private account depends on the investments of all group members in the institution in the first 
stage and their contributions to the joint project in the second stage. The indirect contribution is calculated as: 
Indirect contribution to your private account 
= (Your contribution to the joint project – average contribution of the two other group members to the joint project) × 
(multiplication factor according to Table A) 
If, for example, 3 LD were invested in the institution in the first stage, this yields a multiplication factor of 0.75 according to Table 
A. If, for example, you contribute 10 LD to the joint project in the second stage and the other two group members have an 
average contribution of 20 LD, the indirect contribution to your private account is: (10-20) × (multiplication factor according to 
Table A). The indirect contribution is negative then (-7.5 LD). Conversely, if you contribute 20 LD to the joint project and the other 
two group members contribute 10 LD on average, the indirect contribution to your private account is positive. If the 
multiplication factor is the same (0.75), the indirect contribution is +7.5 LD. 
In general, the indirect contribution to your private account is positive if your contribution to the joint project is higher than the 
average contribution of the other group members to the joint project. The indirect contribution to your private account is 
negative if your contribution to the joint project is less than the average contribution of the other group members to the joint 
project. 
 
The multiplication factor determines how positive or negative the indirect contribution to the private account is. Consequently, 
the more was invested altogether in the institution by all group members in the first stage, the heavier a deviation from the 
average contribution of the other group members is rewarded or penalised. The lower the complete investment in the institution 
in the first stage, the more leniently a deviation from the average contribution in the joint project of the other group members is 
rewarded or penalised. Each LD of your contribution that exceeds the average contribution to the joint project of the other group 
members increases the indirect contribution to your private account by the multiplication factor determined in the first stage. In 
contrast, each LD of your contribution which is below the average contribution to the joint project of the other group members 
reduces the indirect contribution to your private account by the multiplication factor determined in the first stage.  
 
Total contribution to the private account 
The total contribution to the private account consists of the direct and the indirect contributions. 
Total contribution to the private account  
= Direct contribution to the private account + indirect contribution to the private account 
The total contribution to the private account therefore depends on your contribution to the joint project, their relation to the 
contributions to the joint project of the other group members, as well as the investments in the first stage. 
After the instructions you will find a schematic diagram of the correlations. In the upper half, you will find the diagram that shows 
the case in which you invest an additional LD in the joint project. In the lower half, you will find the diagram for the case in which 
an additional LD is invested in the joint project by the two other group members. Each LD that you contribute to the joint project, 
increases your income from the joint project by one unit and reduces the direct contribution to the private account by one unit. 
However, your contribution to the joint project increases in relation to that of the other group members, whereby the indirect 
contribution to your private account increases by the multiplication factor. Each additional LD to the joint project does not 
reduce the total contribution to your private account by one unit, but by (1 – multiplication factor). 
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If each of the two other group members increases his/her contribution to the joint project by one LD, your income from the joint 
project rises by 2 LD. In contrast, your indirect contribution to your private account by the multiplication factor since the average 
contribution to the joint project of the other group members increases by one unit compared to your contribution. 
 
The income from your private account is calculated for all group members using the same formula: 
Income from private account = 5 × (Contribution to own account) – 0.05 × (contribution to own account)2 
The attached table B shows your income from the private account for every amount of your contribution to the private account. 
Unlike in the joint project, in which all group members profit from your contribution, only you can earn money from a 
contribution to your private account.  
If you, for example, contribute 0 LD to your private account, your income from the private account is 0 LD. If you contribute 50 LD 
to your private account, your income from the private account is 125 LD (see table). The income from the private account solely 
depends on your contribution to your private account. 
In the attached table B, you will find your potential total contributions to the private account in LD in the first column. In the 
second column, the respective income from the private account is listed in LD. The third column shows the change in income if 
the total contribution to your private account increases by one unit. The fourth column indicates the change in income if one 
more unit is invested in the joint project. You see that your income increases by exactly one unit if you or another group member 
invests an additional LD in the joint project. In contrast, the change in income from your contributions to your private account 
does not remain constant. The change in income is less the higher the total contribution to your private account already is. If your 
total contribution to the private account is already high, a further contribution to the private account generates a relatively low 
additional income from the private account. If, however, your total contribution to your private account is low, a further 
contribution to the private account generates a relatively high additional income. 
Total income 
The total income is calculated from the income from the joint project and the income from the private account. 
Total income= Income from the joint project + income from the private account 
After the experiment, one of the ten games is selected randomly by the computer for payoff. Therefore, in each stage, you should 
act as if it was relevant to disbursement. Your income from the selected game will be converted from LD into euro. When you 
leave the lab, you will be paid this amount together with the lump sum of 4 euros. 
In the beginning, there will be two trial games, which are not relevant for disbursement. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Schematic Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 additional LD to the joint project from you  
 
Increases the contribution to 
the joint project by 1 unit 
and hence your income from 
the joint project by 1 unit 
Reduces the direct 
contribution to the private 
account 
Increases the indirect 
contribution to the private 
account by the multiplication 
factor (determined by 
investments in the first stage) 
Reduces the total contribution to your private account by (1 – 
multiplication factor) units 
1 additional LD to the joint project from the other group members  
 
Increases the total contribution to the joint 
project by two units und also increases your 
income from the joint project by two units 
Reduces your indirect contribution to the private 
account by the multiplication factor 
25 
 
Table A: Multiplication factor 
Sum of contributions of 
all group members to 
the institution in LD 
Multiplication 
factor 
Change of the 
multiplication 
factor if one more 
unit is contributed 
to the institution 
 
Sum of 
contributions of all 
group members to 
the institution in LD 
Multiplication 
factor 
Change of the 
multiplication factor 
if one more unit is 
contributed to the 
institution 
0 0.00000 0.50000  71 0.98611 0.00019 
1 0.50000 0.16667  72 0.98630 0.00019 
2 0.66667 0.08333  73 0.98649 0.00018 
3 0.75000 0.05000  74 0.98667 0.00018 
4 0.80000 0.03333  75 0.98684 0.00017 
5 0.83333 0.02381  76 0.98701 0.00017 
6 0.85714 0.01786  77 0.98718 0.00016 
7 0.87500 0.01389  78 0.98734 0.00016 
8 0.88889 0.01111  79 0.98750 0.00015 
9 0.90000 0.00909  80 0.98765 0.00015 
10 0.90909 0.00758  81 0.98780 0.00015 
11 0.91667 0.00641  82 0.98795 0.00014 
12 0.92308 0.00549  83 0.98810 0.00014 
13 0.92857 0.00476  84 0.98824 0.00014 
14 0.93333 0.00417  85 0.98837 0.00013 
15 0.93750 0.00368  86 0.98851 0.00013 
16 0.94118 0.00327  87 0.98864 0.00013 
17 0.94444 0.00292  88 0.98876 0.00012 
18 0.94737 0.00263  89 0.98889 0.00012 
19 0.95000 0.00238  90 0.98901 0.00012 
20 0.95238 0.00216  91 0.98913 0.00012 
21 0.95455 0.00198  92 0.98925 0.00011 
22 0.95652 0.00181  93 0.98936 0.00011 
23 0.95833 0.00167  94 0.98947 0.00011 
24 0.96000 0.00154  95 0.98958 0.00011 
25 0.96154 0.00142  96 0.98969 0.00011 
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26 0.96296 0.00132  97 0.98980 0.00010 
27 0.96429 0.00123  98 0.98990 0.00010 
28 0.96552 0.00115  99 0.99000 0.00010 
29 0.96667 0.00108  100 0.99010 0.00010 
30 0.96774 0.00101  101 0.99020 0.00010 
31 0.96875 0.00095  102 0.99029 0.00009 
32 0.96970 0.00089  103 0.99038 0.00009 
33 0.97059 0.00084  104 0.99048 0.00009 
34 0.97143 0.00079  105 0.99057 0.00009 
35 0.97222 0.00075  106 0.99065 0.00009 
36 0.97297 0.00071  107 0.99074 0.00008 
37 0.97368 0.00067  108 0.99083 0.00008 
38 0.97436 0.00064  109 0.99091 0.00008 
39 0.97500 0.00061  110 0.99099 0.00008 
40 0.97561 0.00058  111 0.99107 0.00008 
41 0.97619 0.00055  112 0.99115 0.00008 
42 0.97674 0.00053  113 0.99123 0.00008 
43 0.97727 0.00051  114 0.99130 0.00007 
44 0.97778 0.00048  115 0.99138 0.00007 
45 0.97826 0.00046  116 0.99145 0.00007 
46 0.97872 0.00044  117 0.99153 0.00007 
47 0.97917 0.00043  118 0.99160 0.00007 
48 0.97959 0.00041  119 0.99167 0.00007 
49 0.98000 0.00039  120 0.99174 0.00007 
50 0.98039 0.00038  121 0.99180 0.00007 
51 0.98077 0.00036  122 0.99187 0.00007 
52 0.98113 0.00035  123 0.99194 0.00006 
53 0.98148 0.00034  124 0.99200 0.00006 
54 0.98182 0.00032  125 0.99206 0.00006 
55 0.98214 0.00031  126 0.99213 0.00006 
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56 0.98246 0.00030  127 0.99219 0.00006 
57 0.98276 0.00029  128 0.99225 0.00006 
58 0.98305 0.00028  129 0.99231 0.00006 
59 0.98333 0.00027  130 0.99237 0.00006 
60 0.98361 0.00026  131 0.99242 0.00006 
61 0.98387 0.00026  132 0.99248 0.00006 
62 0.98413 0.00025  133 0.99254 0.00006 
63 0.98438 0.00024  134 0.99259 0.00005 
64 0.98462 0.00023  135 0.99265 0.00005 
65 0.98485 0.00023  136 0.99270 0.00005 
66 0.98507 0.00022  137 0.99275 0.00005 
67 0.98529 0.00021  138 0.99281 0.00005 
68 0.98551 0.00021  139 0.99286 0.00005 
69 0.98571 0.00020  140 0.99291 0.00005 
70 0.98592 0.00020  141 0.99296 0.00005 
    142 0.99301 0.00005 
    143 0.99306 0.00005 
    144 0.99310 0.00005 
    145 0.99315 0.00005 
    146 0.99320 0.00005 
    147 0.99324 0.00005 
    148 0.99329 0.00004 
    149 0.99333 0.00004 
    150 0.99338 - 
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 Table B: Income from private account  
Total contribution 
to the private 
account in LD 
Your income 
from the private 
account in LD 
Change of income if the total 
contribution to your private 
account increases by one unit 
Change of income if one 
more unit is invested in the 
joint project 
0 0.00 4.95 1.00 
1 4.95 4.85 1.00 
2 9.80 4.75 1.00 
3 14.55 4.65 1.00 
4 19.20 4.55 1.00 
5 23.75 4.45 1.00 
6 28.20 4.35 1.00 
7 32.55 4.25 1.00 
8 36.80 4.15 1.00 
9 40.95 4.05 1.00 
10 45.00 3.95 1.00 
11 48.95 3.85 1.00 
12 52.80 3.75 1.00 
13 56.55 3.65 1.00 
14 60.20 3.55 1.00 
15 63.75 3.45 1.00 
16 67.20 3.35 1.00 
17 70.55 3.25 1.00 
18 73.80 3.15 1.00 
19 76.95 3.05 1.00 
20 80.00 2.95 1.00 
21 82.95 2.85 1.00 
22 85.80 2.75 1.00 
23 88.55 2.65 1.00 
24 91.20 2.55 1.00 
25 93.75 2.45 1.00 
26 96.20 2.35 1.00 
27 98.55 2.25 1.00 
28 100.80 2.15 1.00 
29 102.95 2.05 1.00 
30 105.00 1.95 1.00 
31 106.95 1.85 1.00 
32 108.80 1.75 1.00 
33 110.55 1.65 1.00 
34 112.20 1.55 1.00 
35 113.75 1.45 1.00 
36 115.20 1.35 1.00 
37 116.55 1.25 1.00 
38 117.80 1.15 1.00 
39 118.95 1.05 1.00 
40 120.00 0.95 1.00 
41 120.95 0.85 1.00 
42 121.80 0.75 1.00 
43 122.55 0.65 1.00 
44 123.20 0.55 1.00 
45 123.75 0.45 1.00 
46 124.20 0.35 1.00 
47 124.55 0.25 1.00 
48 124.80 0.15 1.00 
49 124.95 0.05 1.00 
50 125.00 -0.05 1.00 
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A5: Z-tree Screenshots 
Figure 8: Z-tree screenshot of 1st stage decision on investment to the enforcement parameter 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Z-tree screenshot of 2nd stage decision on contribution to the public good 
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Figure 10: Z-tree screenshot of the payoff composition of player 1 after the first period 
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